A Black "I" in CIM
Ten years ago, the idea of integrated manufacturing was great. . . a way for companies to flexibly manufacture products at least cost. Using technology to become more competitive seemed promising, and achievable. To some it appeared to be a defensive strategy to counter stiff offshore competition that was taking it's toll on U.S. market share. To others it was a way to respond quickly to the market using slimmer, leaner and more effective resources.

Companies struggling to survive were turning to computer integrated manufacturing (CIM) out of desperation in their efforts to find a better way to manufacture. Over time, the original definition of computer integrated manufacturing was lost as CIM became an acronym for the automated factory. Manufacturers concocted the vision of a completely automated facility where parts were produced with little or no human intervention.

Billions were invested in programmable logic controllers and CNC's for the factory floor, workstations for engineering, personal computers for the office, flexible machining systems, optimizing software, MRP, robots and automated conveyance, etc., all with this vision in mind. Very few knew the real costs involved in a company-wide integration and networking of computers, and the impact it would have on operating profit.

Manufacturers knew it was going to be expensive, but they rationalized the investment in a convoluted sort of way.

• When hard numbers weren't supportive of a good return on investment, the argument was used that the investment can't be justified using short term ROI: it's too myopic.

• When there was difficulty defining the CIM vision in practical terms, and how to get there, the response was that CIM was a journey, and not a destination.

• When asked about direct profit contribution the response was that emphasis was on control: of data, of information, and consequently the business.


What wasn't considered was if it takes so much effort to control the process might there be something inherently wrong in the process itself?

Today, predictions of a doubling of automation expenditures in man- ufacturing haven't materialized. After an initial spending spree, companies are avoiding heavy investments in automation and retrenching to make their technological indulgences work. Although few are willing to openly admit it, savings predicted on CIM aren't surfacing, and it's not surprising.

After all:


• Efforts to automate factories and offices began before fundamental problems were identified and solved.

• Automation was implemented to displace direct labor, which addresses a small percentage of total product cost.

• Islands of technology were implemented with little regard to a m-aster plan and how it would fit together.




The results were predictable. Today, pockets of CIM, FMS's, and cells are grossly underutilized because they were implemented incorrectly or for the wrong reasons.



In a recent survey of manufacturing executives, it was revealed that a surprising number of systems were implemented with no links to operating profits. Most of the benefits that resulted centered around control. Respondents reported a 30% overall systems implementation failure rate, a documented testimonial to the difficulty of implementing manufacturing support systems.



With no guarantee of success, one must wonder why the concentration of efforts has been on the integration of computers in the first place?



Nothing is wrong with integrated manufacturing. It's the implementation that has failed. Automation cannot effectively compensate for decades of problems on the fact